Mexico\u27s American/America\u27s Mexican: Cross-border Flows of Nationalism and Culture between the United States and Mexico by Behnken, Brian D.
History Publications History
2013
Mexico's American/America's Mexican: Cross-
border Flows of Nationalism and Culture between
the United States and Mexico
Brian D. Behnken
Iowa State University, bbehnken@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/history_pubs
Part of the Cultural History Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, Latin American
History Commons, and the United States History Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
history_pubs/99. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in History Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Mexico's American/America's Mexican: Cross-border Flows of
Nationalism and Culture between the United States and Mexico
Abstract
In 2006, immigrant rights protests hit almost every major city in the United States. Propelled by a wave of
anti-immigrant sentiment and proposed immigration legislation that developed out of the 2004 presidential
election, Latino/a activists demanded an end to the biased, and often racist, immigration reform debate, a
debate that characterized immigrants as violent criminals who wantonly broke American law. Individuals of all
ethnicities and nationalities, but mainly Latinos, participated in massive demonstrations to oppose the
legislation and debate. In the Southwest, in cities such as Los Angeles, Phoenix, Dallas, and El Paso, Mexican
Americans showed by force of numbers that they opposed this debate. Activists waved Mexican flags, Catholic
iconography, and American flags to show their militancy and to demand recognition as Americans. Somos
americanos became the movement's catchphrase: "We are Americans."
Disciplines
Cultural History | Inequality and Stratification | Latin American History | United States History
Comments
This is a chapter from Brian D. Behnken. 2013. "Mexico's American/America's Mexican: Cross-border Flows
of Nationalism and Culture between the United States and Mexico". In: Crossing Boundaries: Ethnicity, Race,
and National Belonging in a Transnational World. Brian D. Behnken and Simon Wendt, Editors. Lexington
Books. pp.63-81. Reproduced by permission of Rowman & Littlefield, https://rowman.com/
LexingtonBooks.
Rights
All rights reserved. Please contact the publisher for permission to copy, distribute or reprint.
This book chapter is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/history_pubs/99
Chapter Three 
Mexico's American/America's Mexican 
Cross-border Flows of 
Nationalism and Culture between 
the United States and Mexico 
Brian D. Behnken 
In 2006, immigrant rights protests hit almost every major city in the United 
States. Propelled by a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment and proposed im-
migration legislation that developed out of the 2004 presidential election, 
Latino/a activists demanded an end to the biased, and often racist, immi-
gration reform debate, a debate that characterized immigrants as violent 
criminals who wantonly broke American law. 1 Individuals of all ethnicities 
and nationalities, but mainly Latinos, participated in massive demonstrations 
to oppose the legislation and debate. In the Southwest, in cities such as Los 
Angeles, Phoenix, Dallas, and El Paso, Mexican Americans showed by force 
of numbers that they opposed this debate. Activists waved Mexican flags, 
Catholic iconography, and American flags to show their militancy and to de-
mand recognition as Americans. Somos americanos became the movement's 
catchphrase: "We are Americans."2 
While there is much to comment on about these protests, the use of the 
Mexican flag deserves special attention. La bandera de Mexico is a symbol of 
Mexican and Mexican American pride, but one that for many years remained 
discarded and hidden in the United States. All things "Mexican" in the 
late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century United States were considered 
inferior and circumspect, so Mexican Americans chose not to fly the flag. 3 
However, during the Chicano movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
militant Mexican Americans, who identified with their Mexican heritage 
and embraced a form of Chicano ethnic nationalism, flew the flag with rel-
ish, demanding a reframing of the image of the Mexican flag. For Chicanos, 
the flag represented patria-homeland-and was certainly not something 
to view with scorn and opprobrium. But while embracing the Mexican flag, 
many Chicanos reinterpreted (and for Mexicans abused) what for them was a 
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symbol of cultural pride. For example, to show nationalist pride some Chica-
nos tacked the flag to bedroom walls or the walls of movement headquarters, 
a breach of protocol and Mexican national law. Others sewed the flag onto 
clothing or decorated it with movement symbols, again breaches of protocol. 
Others saluted the flag incorrectly. In short, while Chicanos redefined the 
flag as a symbol in the United States, a symbol imbued with cultural pride 
and ethnic nationalism, their reinterjJretation of the flag's symbolism meant a 
consequent reimagining of Mexican nationalism, a reinterpretation that prob-
ably would have offended many citizens of Mexico.4 
In this chapter, I examine the creation of a sense of hybrid national belong-
ing among Mexicans and Mexican Americans by examining the borrowing 
of cultural symbols and cultural performances by Mexicans in Mexico and 
Mexican Americans in the United States from 1955 to 1975. During this 
period, American cultural products, especially clothing and music, crossed 
the border, became transnational phenomena, and were en vogue in Mexico. 
Mexicans created a sonic landscape that mirrored pioneering rock and rollers 
in the United States. Most importantly, Mexican youth developed a coun-
terculture that they linked to Elvis Presley, creating what has come to be 
known as the "refried Elvis." In the United States, young Chicanos adopted 
Mexican cultural elements as a way of reinforcing the Chicano movement. 
In addition to the flag, Mexican Americans embraced the consumption of 
tequila, menudo, and other foodstuffs; wore serapes and ponchos; and many 
learned to speak Spanish. I argue that in both instances mexicanos and Mexi-
can Americans reinterpreted cultural symbols and in the process attempted 
to rearticulate both American and Mexican nationalism. That reinterpretation 
created a unique syncretic and hybrid form of culture and ethno-national 
identity that blended American and Mexican elements on both sides of the 
border. This transnational exchange was at once Mexican American in the · 
United States, and American Mexican in Mexico. Moreover, I show that this 
transnational exchange and the concomitant evolution of national ideologies 
in both countries spawned a reaction of the majority Mexican and American 
population, a reaction that was often negative, violent, and ugly. 
For Mexican and Mexican American identity formation in the border re-
gion of America's Southwest, nationalism is an inaccurate if not inappropri-
ate term. Given its long history of cross-border contact, many parts of Mexi-
co's Northwest and the American Southwest were sites of a distinct Mexican 
American and American Mexican nationalism: a peculiar, transnational 
kind of nationalism. As historian David Gutierrez has shown, the American 
Southwest and the Mexican Northwest remain in many ways nations within 
the nations. 5 Further from the border region, Mexican and American senses of 
national identity tended to follow Anthony Smith's definition of a nation as 
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a site with distinct territorial boundaries, a shared history and mythos, and a 
national economy. Smith' s definition of nationalism can be seen as too broad 
ranging, but he clearly shows how ethnicity reinforces notions of the nation. 
Smith notes that "a state's ethnic core often shapes the characters and bound-
aries of the nation; for it is very often on the basis of such a core that states 
coalesce to form nations."6 While he avers that this "ethnic core" is real and 
that it predates the modem nation-state, I argue that this process is far more 
dynamic and that the nation's ethnic center is constantly evolving and that its 
modification continues until the dissolution of the nation. Such has been that 
case in the Mexico-United States borderlands, where national belonging has 
always been hybrid and where ethnic nationalism(s) and civic nationalism(s) 
are difficult to untangle. 
Like nationalism, ethnicity is a complicated terminology with differing 
meanings on either side of the border. Ethnicity is a collection of group traits 
that include national origin, ancestral language, religious affiliation, a shared 
history and traditions, and shared culture and cultural symbols, all of which 
confer a sense of identity for a particular group. 7 Race is also often an impor-
tant marker of ethnic group affiliation, one that in many cases has meaning 
for those not in an ethnic community and one that is often meaningless for 
those in an ethnic group. Most white Americans, for instance, would regard 
Mexican Americans as not only having a shared identity, language, history, 
or culture, but also shared phenotypical traits. The fallacy of such an idea is 
that Mexicans and Mexican Americans as a group are ethno-racially diverse. 
Thus they share no phenotypology, and yet are regarded by many Americans 
as racially distinct. 8 
Ethnicity contributes to nationalism and creates forms of ethnic national-
ism primarily through the concept of culture. Cultural forms and cultural 
exchange have a direct impact on nationalist sentiments and ethnic group af-
filiation. As noted above, Smith argues that ethnicity's impact on nationalism 
is foundational and present before the formation of a nation.9 I demonstrate 
below that it is culture that moderates nationalist ideals while simultaneously 
reinforcing ethnicity. More importantly, transnational culture-the physical 
exchange of culture across borders-adjusts a nation's sense of itself over 
time. As such, transnational cultural forms have a direct impact on national-
ism, ethnicity, and ethnic nationalism. Transnational ethnicity and culture 
helped to create syncretic, or what the postcolonial scholar Homi Bhabha 
called "hybrid," forms of culture and nationalism. Bhabha notes that in newly 
emerging postcolonial states hybridity serves as a model of nationalistic 
development. 10 Nowhere in Mexico and the United States is hybridity, trans-
national cultural exchange, and their influence on nationalism and ethnicity 
more visible than in the U.S.-Mexico border region, and in major cities such 
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as Mexico City and Los Angeles. And at no time was the evolution of hybrid 
national identity more visible than in the civil rights era of the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s. 
MEXICO AND AMERICAN TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE 
The physical exchange of cultures and people across the border between 
Mexico and the United States is a well-known phenomenon. Generally, 
scholars and laymen think of this process as one-way. Mexicans move to the 
United States bringing with them traditional, but quickly assimilated, Mexi-
can culture. 11 But the process certainly works in reverse. Particularly during 
the freedom struggles of the 1960s and early 1970s, the ideology of the New 
Left, along with hippie and rock and roll culture, flowed to Mexico City. 
These cultural transmissions from the United States gave Mexican youths an 
outlet to express their political and social frustrations. Unable to challenge 
the dominant party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), the only 
political party in Mexico, through electoral politics, the Mexican students 
instead channeled their anger into rock and roll. 12 
Mexican politics has, in theory, offered the vestiges of full democratic 
participation for its citizenry since the conclusion of the 1910 revolution. 
However, political dissent often found few avenues of expression. Historian 
Judith Hellman has shown that the PRI frequently coopted labor and peasant 
protests by containing them in several peasant and labor auxiliaries. 13 These 
auxiliaries of the PRI worked "to modify or suppress the demands of mem-
bers and to contain potential unrest among peasants and workers." 14 The most 
serious and repressive aspect of this cooptation process was the assassination 
of key dissenters, something Hellman notes was a common occurrence.15 
When student protestors became dissenters, they exposed themselves to the 
process of cooptation and, regrettably, assassination. 
The Mexican university played a prominent role in the political develop-
ment of student radicalism. 16 Mexico's most famous academic institution, 
the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, or UNAM, in particular 
worked to incubate the Mexican left. 17 Nevertheless, the UNAM constantly 
sparred with the state, and the PRI worked to contain the political radicalism 
of UNAM graduates by making token changes and by coopting university 
student groups. University students were deeply troubled by the political 
repression of the PRI. Additionally, students worried about the Mexican gov-
ernment's failure to provide even a small portion of the population of Mexico 
City with an adequate standard of living. 18 Mexico City expanded exponen-
tially throughout the twentieth century, and the rural poor who moved to the 
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city simply formed into a new urban poor. Social programs did not follow 
the expansion of the population, and poor people congregated in shantytowns 
without basic social services like running water. 19 While demanding greater 
social services for the poor from the government in the late 1960s, students 
also lashed out at the PRI 's undemocratic tendencies. In 1968 students drew 
up a list of six demands, most of which requested that the PRI follow the 
democratic principles enumerated by the Mexican constitution, in an effort to 
force the party to change.20 Students then attempted to unite with labor and 
peasant groups, as well as with the new urban poor, to form what historian 
Evelyn Stevens calls a "populist orientation."21 However, much like labor 
and peasant protests, the PRI worked to coopt student radicalism.22 Unable 
to challenge the system effectively through traditional political mechanisms, 
students found an outlet for their frustrations in cultural imports from the 
United States. 
In the 1950s and 1960s rock music became an international sensation. 
Youth in Mexico City adopted an American breed of what they called ro-
canrol culture as a distinctive counterculture known as La Onda (the wave). 
This counterculture emerged as one of the only viable forms of resistance to 
the institutional political culture engendered by the PRI. Mexican musicians 
lashed out at the overwhelming control of the PRI through music and print 
media, and by embracing American hippie culture. As a result of the adop-
tion of hippie culture by Mexican students, American hippies crossed the Rio 
Grande in search of an idealized hippie oasis, adding fuel to the fire of Mexi-
can radicals.23 Indeed, American hippies supplied another cultural element 
to the Mexican rock and roll counterculture. Mexican youths combined the 
counterculture with the newly arrived American hippie culture and accentu-
ated La Onda. Many of the accoutrements of American hippie culture came 
with this combination, including long hair, drug use, and unusual clothing. 
Chicano "hippies" in particular came from the United States "in search of 
an indigenous experience, despite the fact that they did not generally speak 
Spanish, much less the indigenous ... language spoken by most of the local 
people."24 The development of Mexican rocanrol counterculture, the impor-
tation of American hippies and their ideals, and a progressive student move-
ment led directly to violence in Mexic9 City. 
With rock, the PRI met a formidable enemy. Rock music became "a wedge 
against traditional social values and a vehicle for free expression." Rock, in 
short, "was a tool."25 Mexican rockers adopted many of the distinctive as-
pects of American rock culture; flashy clothes, hairstyles, and hip swinging 
dance moves. But Mexican rockers moderated and adapted this culture to suit 
their own senses of ethnic nationalism by singing in Spanish, and by singing 
about themes important to Mexicans. They also adopted as their most potent 
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symbol the likeness of none other than Elvis Aaron Presley. These "refried" 
Elvises wore The King's trademark early 1950s look of black shoes, white 
socks, black pants, white shirt, and black jacket (ala Jailhouse Rock fame). 
This caused much apprehension in Mexico City as worried parents fretted 
over the strange dress and behavior of their children. Beyond parents, the 
government began to fear the radical and subversive aspects of this youth 
culture.26 
Mexican government officials had a hard time dealing with rock culture, 
an unwanted outside agitator. Unlike labor organizations or leftist student 
groups, La Onda was an amorphous, vague cultural ideology that proved dif-
ficult to coopt. The blend of rock and hippie culture was seemingly too much 
for Mexican officials. President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz sounded a cautious note 
in 1968 when he stated, "Everyone is free to let his beard, hair or sideburns 
grow ... so long as he does not harm others' rights or break the law."27 Far 
from a tacit endorsement of Mexican counterculture, the president instead at-
tempted to advocate government tolerance while simultaneously establishing 
that La Onda could be viewed as breaking the law. Diaz Ordaz and others 
worried about the countercultural influence on the Mexican state, especially 
in 1968 as the world prepared for the Olympic Games in Mexico City. 
Student criticism of the Mexican government, in combination with the 
youth counterculture, climaxed in strikes and protests in 1968. Mexico City 
stood to host the Olympic Games, and governmental expenditures for the 
Olympics angered many within activist circles. The expansion of the city's 
population without an expansion in necessary social programs, from garbage 
collection to running water, made the huge amounts of money spent on sports 
venues for the games smack of hypocrisy. 28 But Diaz Ordaz would broach 
no dissent or protests; the Olympic Games were simply too important for 
Mexico's national pride. 29 For Diaz Ordaz, within the Mexican counterculture 
lay a very real threat to the success of the Mexican Olympics. 
The PRI failed to coopt the countercultural movement. Only one strategy 
remained: to destroy La Onda. The government did exactly this at Tlatelolco 
in 1968. In a series of strikes beginning in July of 1968, students clashed 
with local police, and eventually with the army.30 In September of 1968 the 
army occupied the UNAM campus. In response, students organized a mas-
sive parade and held a planning meeting at the Tlatelolco Plaza. The army 
attacked this enormous meeting, killing and wounding men and women of 
all ages. Reports vary on the number of people killed at Tlatelolco. Army 
soldiers maintained a tight net of security during and after the massacre. 
Most Mexican newspapers reported that 20 people were killed, but after the 
massacre these figures constantly increased, from 20 to 29, then from 49 to 
around 200, with many finally settling on the number 325. 31 Historian Don-
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aid Mabry posits that "the Tlatelolco massacre made no sense except that it 
stopped the movement a few days before the Olympic Games opened."32 Eric 
Zolov agrees, while maintaining that the youth counterculture contributed 
significantly to the Mexican government's fear and constituted an important 
reason for why the massacre occurred.33 Zolov also asserts that "one day after 
the massacre ... blame for the 'disturbances' was quickly placed on commu-
nists and other foreign 'agitators"' as well as La Onda.34 Although the coun-
tercultural movement lived on, much student activism died the night of the 
Tlatelolco massacre. The Mexican government bought off and coopted those 
activists who survived the massacre. It took billions of dollars to silence their 
protests, but in the end the PRI purchased the silence of radical dissenters.35 
Other radicals not coopted by the PRI fled Mexico for other, more tolerant, 
countries. Still other student activists were simply left defeated, unwilling to 
continue a fight they knew no one could win. 36 
The eradication of the student movement and its concomitant demands 
for an evolution of both the civic and ethnic nationalism of Mexico tells 
us a great deal about Mexico and its national history. The activists asserted 
themselves in new and unique ways; ways that to Mexican authorities seemed 
foreign and out of step with the Mexican nationalism that originally grew out 
of the revolutionary period. Mexicans had for generations cultivated a civic 
nationalism that hearkened back to the revolution, that insinuated the broader 
population with a shared history and national past, and that allegedly unified 
all Mexicans. The state could broach no dissent of this nationalism. For the 
activists, Mexico's nationalism was not inclusive, and they rebelled by adopt-
ing outside cultural forms. la Onda, which they imbued with ethnic symbol-
ism and their own sense of national pride, in particular, resonated with the ac-
tivists and helped give them a sense of hybrid national belonging. While they 
certainly saw themselves as exercising their own rights, joining in the civic 
ideology of the Mexican nation, and in this way participating in Mexico's 
civic duties and nationalism, their hybrid nationalism was primarily focused 
on ethno-cultural symbols that challenged the dominant civic nationalism of 
Mexico. For this reason, Mexican authorities could not tolerate their activism. 
As such, the activist's ethnic nationalism demonstrates both the power and, 
for the state, the danger of ethno-nationalist ideologies and activism. 
MEXICAN CULTURE, ETHNIC 
NATIONALISM, AND THE CHICANO MOVEMENT 
In the United States, youthful Mexican American activism took the form of 
a militant Chicano movement. Student activists in the southwestern United 
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States utilized aspects of Mexican culture to inspire their own movement. 
Chicano activists in the American Southwest identified with what they per-
ceived to be clearly Mexican cultural practices. These youths grew tired of 
the assimilationist and pro-American attitudes of their parents.37 Instead, 
Mexican American youths embraced a pro-Mexican ethnic nationalist ideol-
ogy, which they summed up in the new philosophy of chicanismo. This new 
activism revealed the frustration of a geJ1eration of Chicano youths who were 
unwilling to endure racism and poverty. They attacked American values 
and institutions, and asserted that the U.S. government had too often acted 
as a tyrant toward Mexico and Mexicans. They protested the poverty level 
of Texas's and California's farmworkers and accused the United States of 
stealing Mexico's land throughout the 1800s (and beyond) after the Mexican-
American War. There are several areas where Chicanos utilized Mexican 
culture to bolster their own sense of ethnic nationalism and develop a sense 
of hybrid national belonging; in protest behavior, in cultural iconography, and 
in the adoption of a Mexican national identity during protests.38 
Chicano protests began in Texas among college-aged youths in the mid-
l 960s. In 1965, they formed the Mexican American Youth Organization 
(MA YO), an organization that proved extremely militant and proffered the 
ideologies of Chicano Power, which endorsed radical activism similar to 
that of the countercultural movement in Mexico City. Chicano Power activ-
ists advocated an antiwar, antiestablishment, and pro-leftist ideology. Like 
their Mexican counterparts, these youths wore what in the United States was 
considered strange clothing (ponchos, serapes, fatigues), let their hair grow 
long, and indulged in illicit drug use. MA YO students identified with their 
Mexican past and culture, although their views stereotypically idealized and 
romanticized Mexico as a utopia filled with sombrero-wearing peasants. At 
many MA YO rallies, speeches were given in Spanish, activists waved Mexi-
can flags, and held aloft posters of Che Guevara. On several occasions, police 
cracked down on students, detaining and arresting hundreds.39 
In 1968, Houston-area high school students engaged in school walkouts. 
These students, identifying with their Mexican heritage, grew tired of be-
ing treated like second-class citizens in Texas schools. Teachers often made 
Mexican American students feel inferior if they did not grasp English or if 
they spoke Spanish. Indeed, teachers often punished students if they spoke 
Spanish.40 Students drafted a list of demands, similarly to Mexican student 
protestors, requesting the fair treatment of Chicano students, the adoption of 
Mexican American history courses and cultural programs, and the hiring of 
Chicano counselors who could identify with the specific needs of Mexican 
American students.41 In order to publicize their demands, students planned a 
general walkout to coincide with the September 16 Mexican holiday celebrat-
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ing the end of Spanish colonialism. On September 16, 1969, over one hun-
dred students walked out of Jefferson Davis Senior High School, had a rally 
where they vigorously waved Mexican flags, and then picketed the school for 
several hours. Nearly two hundred students also walked out of several other 
schools to show their support for the Jeff Davis activists. In response, police 
arrested numerous students and the district expelled many more.42 
Chicano activists also engaged in a third party political movement to chal-
lenge the two-party system in the United States. Chicanos associated with 
MA YO and other groups founded La Raza Unida Party (RUP) in 1970. For 
the RUP activists, political participation would demonstrate the power of 
the minority vote and force broader integration in the Southwest. They had 
to demand integration and, if it proved unforthcoming, force integration. La 
Raza Unida Party intended to elect candidates who would respond to minor-
ity community's needs. With this objective, they implicitly criticized the 
dominant parties' neglect of Mexican American voters. 43 RUP broadcast this 
message to voters across the Southwest. 
While RUP's leaders hoped to elect leaders to local, state, and national 
offices, their party could be seen as an ethno-national critique of American 
nationalism. While implicitly criticizing the civic nationalism of the United 
States, they also infused the party and their own activism with ethno-cultural 
symbols borrowed from Mexico. This included frequent use of Spanish, de-
pictions of the Mexican flag, the use of foods and fiestas to attract voters, and 
a militant critique of the United States, especially its role in the war in Viet-
nam. Their efforts to elect political leaders represented their own recognition 
of the power of the democratic and civic nationalism of the United States. But 
they presented this understanding through distinctly ethno-national terms. As 
such, their nationalism was a fusion of civic and ethnic national forms-a 
hybrid national belonging. Some activists did desire an entirely new form of 
Chicano ethnic nationalism, and they sought territorial independence to make 
that nationalism a reality. This was most evident in the Chicano movement's 
understanding of Aztlan, the mythical birthplace of the Aztecs that was geo-
graphically located in the border region, as well as in some facets of Chicano 
activism, especially the land grant movement pioneered by Reies Lopez 
Tijerina. Most activists did not seriously consider the territorial acquisition 
of a Chicano homeland a reality, but the "mythohistorical interventions" that 
Aztlan represented was in keeping with the broader cultural borrowings that 
underpinned Chicano nationalist thinking.44 
Leaders in the Democratic and Republican Parties reacted viscerally to 
RUP. They saw the party as not only a challenge to the two-party hegemony, 
but to the broader national identity of the United States. Some interpreted 
their challenge as nothing more than a pathetic attempt by unruly minorities 
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to usurp power from the dominant parties. Others saw RUP and its leaders 
as reverse racists who wanted nothing more than to punish the United States 
for past inequalities. Leaders in both parties countered RUP with aggressive 
campaigns to both run contenders against RUP candidates and to ridicule 
their efforts. The reaction of Democratic and Republican rivals also helped 
seal RUP's fate. RUP's militant ethnic nationalist focus and criticism of the 
U.S. civic culture ultimately provoke'd a counter response that helped destroy 
the fledgling party.45 
In Los Angeles, California, Chicano youths also engaged in school walk-
outs, or blowouts, to dramatize problems in school, especially punishment 
for speaking Spanish. After a series of school walkouts, replete with Mexican 
flags and Che posters, Los Angeles police cracked down on the protestors, 
arresting hundreds and beating a number of young activists. This distinctly 
violent and negative reaction angered activists, but the students' protests also 
angered local people not affiliated with the Chicano community. Many white 
Los Angelenos looked on in horror at the protests and rejoiced when police 
suppressed the gatherings. Spoken Spanish, hardly a sign of anti-American 
militancy today, was seen by many at the time as the cultural equivalent of 
armed insurrection against the state. Thus, police repression was not only 
warranted but needed to protect the body politic of the United States.46 
Throughout 1968 and 1969, Chicano school protests materialized across 
the Southwest. Not only were these protests met with police suppression in 
Los Angeles, Dallas, Phoenix, Houston, and elsewhere, but the demonstra-
tions also caught the attention of the federal government. Numerous Chicano 
civil rights groups, therefore, were soon infiltrated by the FBI's counterintel-
ligence program, or COINTELPRO. FBI agents surreptitiously infiltrated 
Chicano groups and succeeded in disrupting them. This disruption often 
consisted of agents goading Chicanos to commit unlawful acts such as the 
firebombing of the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles in 1969. The result was of-
ten the arrest and incarceration of important Chicano leaders, which worked 
to damage Chicano organizations by depriving them of leadership. In some 
cases, FBI infiltrators took over leadership once movement leaders were ar-
rested, thereby coopting and eventually destroying these groups. 
In the summer of 1970, Chicano activists across the Southwest engaged in 
protests against the Vietnam War. Chicanos formed one of the only ethnic an-
tiwar organizations, the National Chicano Antiwar Moratorium. Many Chica-
nos felt that U.S. actions in Vietnam did not differ from previous aggressions 
committed against Latin America (Mexico in particular) or other countries. 
Indeed, many engaging in the ideology of chicanismo felt a kinship with the 
Vietnamese, who represented another dark-skinned people subjected to an 
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American brand of imperialism. In July of 1970, one thousand demonstrators 
gathered in downtown Houston to condemn American actions in Vietnam 
and to call for an end to Chicano involvement in the conflict. Their protests 
were disrupted by police and a group of pro-war marines, who beat many of 
the antiwar protestors.47 The most famous Chicano antiwar protest occurred 
in Los Angeles in August of 1970. The Chicano Moratorium engineered this 
massive demonstration to protest unfair draft practices and to dramatize the 
disproportionate numbers of young Chicanos and blacks sent to and killed in 
Vietnam. At the protest, approximately thirty thousand protestors marched 
through East Los Angeles. They sang freedom songs in Spanish and English, 
carried Mexican flags, and many protestors dressed in ponchos and serapes. 
LAPD riot police met the marchers at a local park, where they stormed the 
demonstration, fired teargas, and beat and arrested numerous marchers. The 
police also murdered Gustav Montag and Ruben Salazar. Montag, a Sep-
hardic Jew, had joined the Chicano protests against the war because of a 
distinct feeling of solidarity with the Mexican American community. After 
being chased from the park by police, Montag and several Chicanos found 
themselves cornered as they tried to escape down a blind alley. As the officers 
aimed their weapons, Montag and the others attempted to repel the police by 
throwing bottles and rocks. Police opened fire, riddling Montag's body with 
bullets and killing him instantly. Ruben Salazar, the voice of the Chicano 
community at the LA Times, had written scathing and negative editorials 
about police abuse of Mexican-origin people. Two LAPD officers found 
Salazar, who had taken refuge from the police onslaught at a local bar, and 
shot him in the head with a tear gas canister. The attack crushed Salazar' s 
skull, and he died several hours later.48 
Perhaps nothing symbolized state repression of the Chicano movement 
like the violence at the Los Angeles moratorium protest and the murders of 
Gustav Montag and Ruben Salazar. While the murders experienced in the 
United States were far less violent than the massacre in Mexico, the results 
were predictably similar. The l 970 Los Angeles antiwar protest was the last 
demonstration of the Chicano Moratorium. The organization folded shortly 
thereafter. For many Chicanos, the police power of both the state and federal 
governments were far too much to ov.ercome. Demoralized by the violence, 
many Chicanos withdrew from the movement. 
For Chicano activists, the United States had not lived up to its obligation 
toward all Americans, especially Americans who descended from ethno-
racial groups. By organizing around a rallying call of ethnic nationalism and 
by using the civic and electoral apparatus of the United States, Chicanos both 
criticized and utilized varying forms of nationalism. They critiqued Ameri-
can civic nationalism by adopting a militant ethnic nationalism that utilized 
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Mexican cultural symbols, the Spanish language, and other forms of transna-
tional culture. But they also used the electoral process, nay, the civic national-
ism of the United States, to make their ethnic national focus a reality. Their 
hybrid national identity, while perhaps unique, provoked a response from 
the state. While not as violent as the response to radicals in Mexico, the U.S. 
government, state and local government, and Democratic and Republican 
Party leaders all reacted negatively to the Chicano activists. They all worked 
to destroy the Chicano movement. 
CONCLUSION 
The American's Mexican and the Mexican's American connoted a transna-
tional sense of Mexican culture in America and American culture in Mexico. 
In the United States, activists saw Chicano Power as Mexican Power. Chi-
cano youths rediscovered, or discovered as was often the case, their Mexican 
roots in the late 1960s and early 1970s, augmenting their militant ethnic 
nationalism with a greater sense of their own ancestry and heritage. Invoking 
this past often meant little more than speaking Spanish instead of English. 
Chicano activists also adopted the Mexican national flag as a sign of their 
radicalism and to represent their connection to Mexico. They viewed the 
United States as a plural society that welcomed all ethno-national groups. The 
desired a broader, more inclusive nationalism. So too did Mexican radicals in 
Mexico City. Altering the broader culture in Mexico and evoking a new sense 
of Mexican ethnic nationalism often involved something as basic as listening 
to, and later singing and playing, American styles of music. American music 
became protest music, a wedge between the activists and the state. 
These similarities aside, the protests that Mexican and Chicano activists 
engaged in were also dissimilar. UNAM students in Mexico City had differ-
ent goals than did Chicano students in Houston or Los Angeles. While Mexi-
can youths protested deep-seated poverty and political stagnation, Chicano 
youths protested American racism and the Jim Crow system. Mexican youths 
were not punished nor derided for speaking Spanish, nor were Chicano 
students killed in massive numbers for protesting. In each country activists 
attempted to open their respective nations' understanding of nationalism and 
craft a more inclusive, hybrid national identity. 
Transcultural transmissions were key to crafting hybrid national belong-
ing. Mexican youths used American cultural imports for their own advantage 
and manipulated these cultural forms to suit their own needs. Rock and roll 
culture became a tool to force the PRI to change its ways. American hippie 
culture was similarly used by Mexican youths both to show their displeasure 
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with the political, social, and economic systems in Mexico-including their 
displeasure with Mexican nationalism-and also to freak people out. The 
New Left, it would appear, was more than simply an American phenomenon. 
Rather, it crossed borders and generated radicalism in new locales. 
Chicano activists likewise benefited from the culture of Mexico. Chicano 
students identified with the brutal treatment of the Mexican students by the 
Mexican government, although Chicanos were unwilling to criticize the 
Mexican government. Chicano students waved the Mexican flag to symbolize 
their connection with Mexico. They also fought for the adoption of Mexican 
cultural heritage and history programs in southwestern schools. These stu-
dents also chose to celebrate Mexican holidays supposedly "forgotten" by 
their parents, including el diez y seis de septiembre (Mexican independence) 
and cinco de mayo (commemorating the 1862 battle of Puebla). They saw 
in these cultural forms a powerful way to analyze their own ideologies and 
understand and refine their sense of national belonging. 
Clearly, culture and cultural exchange played a key role in the development 
of political and social ideologies in both Mexico and the United States. The 
transnational and cross-border flow of cultural elements and national symbols 
inspired Americans of Mexican descent and Mexican youths in Mexico City. 
These cultural and nationalistic products gave new meaning to movements in 
the United States and Mexico, altering the meaning of the terms "Mexican" 
and "American" and their concomitant ethnic connotations. Interestingly, 
activists in both nations frequently reinterpreted their borrowed cultural ele-
ments. For example, La Onda' s refried Elvis took a distinctly American rocker 
and transformed The King into a Mexican symbol. But the refried Elvis in 
late 1960s Mexico was The King from the 1950s United States. The Mexican 
Elvis was about a decade off the mark from the Elvis of the late 1960s (who 
by this time had already started to become the "fat Elvis"). In taking The King 
out of chronology, Mexican youths reinterpreted the real, and by this point 
aging, Elvis. But that new interpretation was purposeful. Mexican youths took 
as their model the most radical and disruptive form of The King they could 
locate. By appropriating the Elvis of the 1950s, Mexicans not only reminded 
those in-the-know about the fears and apprehensions that Elvis generated in 
the 1950s, they helped imbue their own movement with some of The King's 
radicalism. As such, while perhaps incorrectly visualizing Elvis, the students 
created a hybrid Elvis to help radicalize and popularize their movement. 
And it worked. The refried Elvis gave Mexican students an outlet for their 
frustrations, a vehicle for their activism, and a symbol for their movement. 
Combined with the adoption of hippie culture, Mexican youths succeeded in 
disrupting the national character of Mexico and its capital city to the point 
that the state lashed out violently at their actions, Perhaps the Tlatelolco 
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massacre, while it helped destroy the movement, showed the success of 
Mexican radicals, since it provoked such an incredible response from the gov-
ernment. The refried Elvises helped moderate Mexican culture by bringing 
in foreign elements and reframing them to suit the needs of Mexican people. 
Today this adoption and restructuring of American culture can still be seen in 
Mexican music, especially the continued popularity of Mexican rock, but also 
Mexican hip hop, rap, and interestingJy enough, country music.49 
Such was the case in the United States, where Chicano youths adopted 
aspects of Mexican culture and with them generated a violent and negative 
response from the government. While spoken Spanish may not today seem 
all that radical, at the time it was, and demanding a cessation to punishment 
for speaking Spanish was in many ways an insurrectionary act. The general 
acceptance of spoken Spanish today is in part due to the activism of the 
1960s. The same cultural borrowing can be seen in food and clothing. For 
generations, Mexican culinary products like tequila and menudo were seen 
as inferior and unwanted in the United States. Many Mexican Americans 
drank tequila and ate menudo, a traditional Mexican soup made of tripe, in 
hiding. Chicanos embraced drinking tequila and eating menudo because they 
saw in these foods the strength and adaptability of their ancestors. Chicanos 
also wore what they saw as traditional Mexican garb, particularly ponchos 
and serapes, in order to recognize the strength of their ancestors. The general 
popularity of tequila and the widespread consumption of menudo (you can 
find it on the menu of just about every Mexican restaurant) was the result of 
Chicano activism at the time. And finally, the flag--Chicanos adopted the 
Mexican flag as the symbol of their movement. The Mexican flag made ap-
pearances at almost every major Chicano protest in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. As with other imports from Mexico, the Mexican flag was long looked 
upon by white Americans as a foreign symbol of despotism and sociocultural 
backwardness, which caused Mexican-origin people to refrain from flying 
the flag in the United States. But during the Chicano movement, youths 
embraced the flag, rearticulating what it meant in the United States. The flag 
represented homeland and history, but it also served as a thorn in the side of 
Americans, something Chicanos could use to frustrate their critics. And it 
worked. As in Mexico City, the adoption of Mexican cultural symbols and 
products in the United States spawned a violent and negative reaction from 
the state and federal government. Perhaps the success of these cultural ele-
ments can be seen in this negative reaction. 
As in Mexico City, Mexican Americans in the United States in many 
ways reinterpreted Mexican culture. For example, while spoken Spanish 
was important, many Chicanos were monolingual and they had to learn 
how to speak Spanish. Because of their developing knowledge of the 
Mexico's American/America's Mexican 77 
Spanish language, many Chicanos spoke in a broken and ungrammatical 
Spanish that Mexicans frequently did not understand. So too with cloth-
ing-Chicanos utilized the poncho and serape, a type of dress that relatively 
few Mexicans used in the 1960s, save for folks in the countryside. While 
Chicanos reframed the consumption of certain foodstuffs, they often did 
so incorrectly. For example, menudo is often served on special occasions, 
but Chicanos ate menudo regularly and often added products-potatoes, 
chicken, ground beef-that would not be found in traditional recipes. Chi-
cano use of the Mexican flag was also problematic as they often used and 
handled the flag incorrectly and contrary to Mexican law and custom. But 
as the Mexican rocanrolers had done, Chicano usage of Mexican culture 
created-or openly acknowledged-a syncretic form of Mexican/ American 
culture and ethnicity in the United States. By adopting and embracing as-
pects of Mexican nationalism and culture, Chicanos helped reforge the eth-
nic identity of Mexican Americans. That reforging was the most clearly felt, 
and readily obvious, way for them to (re)create an understanding of ethnic 
nationalism. And the way we understand Mexican Americans today is due 
in large part to the transnational and transcultural borrowings of Chicanos 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
In each of these cases, the inculcation of foreign cultural elements proved 
an important mechanism through which Mexican and American students 
vented their social, political, and economic frustrations. This transnational 
cultural flow proved to be both Mexican American in the United States, and 
American Mexican in Mexico. Transnational cultural exchange helped re-
frame the basic idea of what it meant to be a Mexican in Mexico and what it 
meant to be an American of Mexican descent in the United States. It helped 
create a hybrid, novel, and more expansive vision of nationalism, ethnicity, 
and ethnic nationalism. Transnationalism expanded the definition of what 
it meant to be American in the United States and Mexican in Mexico. That 
reevaluation of ethnicity in both countries went far in developing our modem 
understanding of Mexican and Mexican American national, cultural, and 
ethnic identity. 
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